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Abstract
This article takes issue with the claim made by Tremewan (2005a) that the 
New Zealand social sciences have been uncritical of neotraditionalist and 
culturalist trends in social policy. It points out that at least since the 980s 
there has existed a significant body of social science literature critical of these 
trends. The article also takes issue with Tremewan’s attribution of increased 
political dissent in the area of Maori affairs to the culturalist ideological cur-
rents dominating social policy. The article provides an alternative explanation 
for this increase in political dissent by focusing upon the material conditions 
of existence and the opportunism of power-seeking politicians.
introduction
In his article ‘Ideological Conformity: A Fundamental Challenge to the Social 
Sciences in New Zealand’, Tremewan (2005a) asks the question why has there 
been such ‘a welling-up of unexpressed political dissent’ in the area of Maori 
affairs in recent years ‘that it was available for political mobilisation’ by the 
National Party in the lead-up to the 2005 parliamentary elections (p.). His 
answer is that an extreme form of culturalism has become embedded in New 
Zealand social policy and this has alienated large sections of the population. 
He also takes up the concern of Elizabeth Rata (2000), that there has arisen 
in New Zealand a neotribal elite who, by calculated political leverage of the 
opportunities afforded by the marriage of culturalist ideology and neoliberal-
ism, have gained control of Treaty of Waitangi grievance settlements, and have 
brokered a non-democratic neo-traditionalist ideology into the institutions of 
the democratic state. But the main objective of Tremewan’s paper is to ask why 
the social sciences have been complicit in these developments (p.9) – why 
they have been active in supporting the culturalist social policy agenda? – and 
he calls for a more critical social science.
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The question of why there has been a rise in the level of public dissent in re-
cent years over government handling of Maori affairs is an important one, and 
I will return to it in the second part of this paper. But first I would like to take 
issue with the claim that the New Zealand social sciences have been uncritical 
of neo-traditionalist ideology and culturalist social policy.
IDEOLOGICAL CONFORMITY?
I welcome Tremewan’s call for a critical social science, and have always tried 
to work within that tradition myself. When I was a graduate student at Auck-
land University in the 970s I found myself attracted to the Frankfurt School 
of critical theorists, and adopted the insights of one it its members, Jurgen 
Habermas, in my PhD thesis (Barber 986). I took as my point of departure, 
Habermas’ warnings about the consequences of the administrative appropria-
tion of culture:
Cultural traditions have their own vulnerable conditions of repro-
duction. They remain ‘living’ as long as they take shape in an un-
planned, nature-like manner, or are shaped with [reflective or criti-
cal] consciousness … In both cases appropriated cultural contents 
retain their imperative force, that is, they guarantee the continuity 
of a history through which individuals and groups can identify with 
themselves and with one another. A cultural tradition loses precise-
ly this force as soon as it is objectivistically prepared and strategi-
cally employed. In both cases conditions for the reproduction of 
cultural traditions are damaged, and the tradition is undermined. 
This can be seen in the museum-effect of a hedonistic historicism, 
as well as in the wear and tear that results from the exploitation of 
cultural contents for administrative or market purposes. (Haber-
mas 976:70–7)
In my PhD thesis I argued that the administrative appropriation of Maori cul-
ture under the government’s policies of ‘biculturalism’ and ‘devolution’ would 
produce just this sort of wear and tear, and I tried to demonstrate this in a 
study of central government, local body, and Maori community cooperation 
in the area of employment creation. I remember being told by one of the gate-
keepers of social science research funding at the time that if I persisted with 
this line of inquiry I would never get any research funds, and, what is more, 
my thesis would never be passed. But I did persist (without research funds) 
and the thesis was passed, and one or two people may even have read it. 
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Later, Jeff Sissons (993), in describing ‘the systemic use of Maori tradition’ in 
New Zealand during the 970s and 980s, argued that Maori language, marae, 
hui ceremony, beliefs and values had been ‘selectively appropriated’ by the 
state to enhance Maori identity and self-esteem, and improve social integra-
tion, Maori self-administration, and state legitimacy. The result, he said, was 
‘a fragmentation, objectification and standardisation of form and meaning’ in 
which Maori tradition appeared as ‘an awkward, distorted simulation of ‘the 
real’’ (p.3). But the most concerted critique of biculturalism in recent years 
has been that of Elizabeth Rata (2000). Her critique differed from that of mine 
in that, whereas I focused on the government’s administrative appropriation 
of Maori culture, she gave far greater weight to the agency of Maori in the 
construction of the bicultural relationship. I appear to have underestimated 
the bureaucratic and capitalistic ambitions of the rising Maori middle-class 
and naively interpreted Maori culture as essentially non-capitalistic. Steven 
Webster at the time said that I was too ‘culturalist’ in my approach (personal 
communication). 
Elsewhere (Barber 989) I discussed the ‘administrative appropriation of cul-
ture’ in the context of contemporary capitalism, with its tendency to absorb 
increasing quantities of not only economic but also socio-cultural resources 
in its effort to sustain its crisis-ridden path of development. There I made the 
prediction that future conflicts in New Zealand ‘race relations’ would be over 
the utilization of resources devolved to Maori organization via the Waitangi 
Tribunal. I had in mind that pressure would be brought to bear upon Maori 
organizations to utilize these resources in a capitalist way, and that this would 
contradict the non-capitalist values of Maori society. What I hadn’t envisaged 
was that the pressure to utilize these resources capitalistically would come 
from within Maori society itself, and that the conflicts would be between dif-
ferent groups of Maori (see the discussion of the distribution of Fisheries As-
sets below). 
After 989 I ceased to focus on things Maori. For one reason, a growing 
number of Maori researchers were making research and commentary on 
Maori issues by non-Maori clearly unwelcome (Tremewan [2005:0] refers to 
this sort of pressure as ‘intellectual intimidation’) . But also I wanted to extend 
my ethnographic horizons. So for the next ten years I focused my research 
activity on Papua New Guinea. I continued, however, to be interested in eth-
nic politics, and I read with interest what others were writing about it in New 
Zealand. And much of it seemed to be very critical of what Tremewan, in his 
article, calls ‘neo-traditionalism’ (2005: 4, 2). 
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For example, in the 980s one of the important issues in anthropology was 
the ‘politics of tradition’ - the thesis that custom and tradition can be manipu-
lated to legitimise chiefly and other inegalitarian forms of polity (Keesing and 
Tonkinson 982, Keesing 989; Hobsbawm and Ranger 983). In 990 Mike 
Goldsmith, at Waikato University, organized a conference of the New Zealand 
Association of Social Anthropologists on ‘The Politics of Interpretation’. The 
keynote speaker was Roger Keesing (992), one of the luminaries in the ‘poli-
tics of tradition’ debate, and a number of papers presented at that conference 
addressed this issue. 
Shortly before the conference, a controversy had broken out involving the 
American cultural anthropologist Alan Hanson (989) who had offended 
some New Zealand anthropologists with his depiction of Maori culture as 
‘invented’. In the climate of growing Pakeha distrust of some Maori claims to 
cultural authenticity, Hanson’s depiction was seen as reckless, particularly as it 
was picked up and sensationalised by the New Zealand media. And some New 
Zealand anthropologists wanted him chastised. My own contribution to this 
debate was to try and shift the blame, from Hanson the individual onto the 
culturalist framework within which he worked, and from which the offending 
statements seemed to me to logically derive. (I felt that some of those seek-
ing to chastise Hanson were engaged in much the same theoretical project as 
him). I am grateful to Steven Webster for preserving my contribution to this 
debate in his own much broader discussion of this issue:
Do we need to attribute the unwelcome interpretations of Hanson’s 
work to his own thoughtlessness, incaution, or even mischievous-
ness? Or could such consequences be seen as flowing predictably out 
of the theoretical tradition in which he writes? When for example, 
both cultural invention and ordinary everyday social reproduction 
are seen, as they are by Hanson, in terms of ‘sign-substitution in a 
play of signification’ (p.898), and his own anthropological writings 
are seen in the same terms (p.899), is it any wonder that self-serv-
ing interpretations might be derived from it? And if the tradition 
in which he writes denies, as he claims, any solid foundation for 
truth and knowledge, then doesn’t it also provide the licence to in-
terpret things in any way one pleases? By the same token, doesn’t it 
also deny any notion of responsibility for what is written? These are 
some of the sorts of questions that might be usefully addressed to 
Hanson’s theoretical approach and to some of the other approaches 
in anthropology that go under the broad heading of ‘interpretive’. 
(Barber 990, cited in Webster 998: 235).   
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My purpose in recounting these events today has been to point out that at 
least since the 980s, New Zealand anthropologists have been critically dis-
cussing culturalism and neo-traditionalism in New Zealand ethnic politics. 
But by way of further illustration of this fact, I will summarise below some of 
the more readily accessible writings in this area. For convenience of presenta-
tion I have organised them under a number of headings describing their main 
empirical focii: Fisheries Assets, Cultural Nationalism, and Devolution.
Fisheries Assets
In 992, the government transferred to a group of government appointed 
commissioners commercial fisheries assets for distribution to iwi in return for 
the relinquishing of claims to fisheries under the Treaty of Waitangi. One of 
the controversial issues to emerge from this deal was how iwi (the recipients 
of shares in the assets) were to be defined. As Levine (2002) has pointed out, 
it was a state appointed authority, the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commis-
sion, that was called upon to decide what an iwi was, and when Urban Maori 
Authorities – equally nontraditional organizations – disputed their definition, 
it was the Court, a state institution, that had the final say (p.77–79). What was 
at issue in this dispute was which form of contemporary Maori organization, 
Tribal Trust Boards or Urban Maori Authorities, was more ‘traditional’. But 
the point of Levine’s discussion is that whatever way you looked at it, it was 
State institutions that were deciding the answer. Cheater and Hopa (997) had 
also pointed out the role of the State in constructing Maori and iwi identities 
in their earlier discussion of this and other issues. 
It also had been pointed out that there was more at issue in this State driven 
process of identity construction than that of mere ‘cultural authenticity’; there 
was the class interests of the parties behind the contending definitions. As 
Levine put it 
Although all the principals in the iwi debate are Maori, the class 
interests represented by the Commission and UMAs [Urban Maori 
Authorities] are clearly divergent. Urban Maori unaffiliated with 
tribes tend to be less affluent than the iwi fundamentalists. The di-
rectors of the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission maintain 
close links with government and some have been knighted, while 
those who run UMAs can boast street credibility. The Commission-
ers subscribe to a big-business, anti-welfare, model of Maori devel-
opment, while the unemployed or working class person wants to 
see the assets doing something directly for them. (p.8)
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In anthropological terms, what was at play here was the ‘politics of tradition’, 
just that in this case it was Fisheries Commissioners rather than tribal chiefs 
or custom leaders who were appealing to ‘tradition’ to mask their class in-
terests (p.8). Webster (2002), in his discussion of these events, viewed the 
struggle slightly differently from Levine. Webster saw it as a struggle between 
two ‘new Maori elites’ (the Fisheries Commissioners and the Urban Maori 
Authority chief executives), both of whom had been drawn into the net of 
restructured capitalism, while ‘the poor majority of rural and urban Maori’ 
watched ‘sceptically from the sidelines’ (p.37). 
If it is not already clear, the point I am trying to make by revisiting this issue is 
that all of these anthropologists, Levine, Cheater, Hopa and Webster, regard-
less of their slight differences of interpretation, were unequivocal in their at-
tribution of material interests to the parties involved in the dispute, and they 
were all equally dismissive of the culturalist perspective. The same can be said 
for most other anthropological or sociological studies of ethnic politics in 
New Zealand during the 990s.
Cultural Nationalism
As early as 984, Hauraki Greenland had produced a penetrating analysis of 
the Maori protest movement in which he detailed the politicisation of Maori 
cultural symbols in their idealist critique of Pakeha domination. In 996, 
Poata-Smith brought this form of analysis up to date in a critical examina-
tion of the ideological assumption and political effectiveness of ‘cultural na-
tionalism’ as a strategy for Maori liberation. Poata-Smith traced the origin of 
the Maori protest movement to the struggle to win Maori studies and Maori 
language programmes in the education system, and he argued that for a large 
section of the movement an emphasis on the rediscovery of culture came to 
be the objective, rather than political struggle. With its emphasis on lifestyle 
change, the movement presented no threat to the State, and was easily accom-
modated by the State policies of the 980s (pp.06–7). This accommodation, 
Poata-Smith says, resulted in a dramatic expansion of employment opportu-
nities for middle-class professional Maori, but it provided no benefits for the 
vast majority of working-class Maori bearing the brunt of the 990s economic 
restructuring. In the final analysis, Poata-Smith saw ‘cultural nationalism’ as 
having failed as a strategy for Maori liberation; first, because it lacked atten-
tion to the issues of class, it failed to take into account the working-class loca-
tion of the majority of Maori; and second, because of its culturalism, it was 
unable to form strategic alliances with other progressive movements of the 
time (p. ). Once again, as we saw with the analyses of the fisheries assets dis-
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tribution process, analytical attention was given to the issue of material class 
interests, with an accompanying political critique of culturalism.
Devolution
‘Devolution’ was the name given to the policy beginning in the 980s whereby 
the government sought to shift social welfare responsibilities for Maori clients 
onto Maori organizations. As Barcham (998) demonstrated, the iwi organi-
zations targeted by this policy were required to pass stringent government 
accountability standards, with the outcome that the ‘dynamic character of 
Tikanga Maori … [was] lost’ (p.306). Roger Maaka (994) arrived at a similar 
conclusion in his study of the formal retribalization of an urban Maori group 
in Christchurch to fit it for the delivery of government-funded welfare pro-
grammes. He argued that the process was hampered by government policies 
that ‘attempt to freeze-dry the tribe, and indeed Maori culture as a whole, at 
an arbitrary point in time that ignores the fact that social grouping is a proc-
ess’ (p.34). He concluded that
the notion of the tribe-cum-nation as an expression of mana Maori 
motuhake ‘Maori sovereignty’ is more an ideology of the politically 
active and the educated elite than a reality for the flax roots of Maori 
society. The issue cannot be seen in terms of a simple opposition 
between tribal social organization and pan-Maori groupings; re-
tribalization in the 990s, if it is to be effective, requires a radical 
redefinition of tribe rather than the revitalization of a traditional 
sociopolitical grouping. Membership of the new tribe will need to 
be defined by association, commitment, and domiciliary location 
rather than by descent alone (p.329)
Both of these accounts of the devolution process reiterate the position that 
contemporary forms of Maori social organization are far from traditional. 
They also, if I may say, bear out the predictions that I had made earlier in 
my PhD thesis, following Habermas’ comments on the corrosive effect of the 
administrative appropriation of culture.
Patrons of Maori Culture
The most concerted attack upon the culturalist paradigm in New Zealand an-
thropology has been that of Steven Webster. In his book Patrons of Maori Cul-
ture (998), Webster set out to deliberately counter culturalist interpretations 
of the situation of Maori culture in New Zealand. He examines the contempo-
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rary situation of Maori and argues that an idealist anthropological preconcep-
tion of culture has obscured the real situation as it has emerged from colonial 
and recent history. The real situation, he says, shows that the ‘beneficiaries 
of the cultural ‘renaissance’ may be more its opportunistic patrons, Maori as 
well as Pakeha, than the majority of Maori themselves.’ (p.9). He traced the 
roots of the idealist conception of Maori culture to the 920s, when, he says, 
it was developed as one more acceptable to the sensitivities and fears of the 
bourgeoisie than the actual culture that was emerging in the behaviour of 
working-class Maori. He sees the contemporary image of Maori culture that 
has been developed during the recent Maori renaissance as performing the 
same ideological functions. And Webster attributes the idealist obfuscation of 
Maori culture to the emergence of post-structural and postmodernist theo-
ries in the late 980s. 
Do I need to say more? My objective here has been to point out that there 
does exist a significant body of social science literature in New Zealand that 
has been critical of neo-traditionalism in New Zealand ethnic politics, and of 
culturalist theory. Sometimes the criticism of culturalism is implicit, in that a 
preferred approach (usually with a political economy bent) has been adopted; 
sometimes (as with Poata-Smith and Webster) the critique is explicit. Further 
examples can and have been given by others (for example Sissons 2005, Ryan 
2005). 
I will return now to the more important question of why there has been a rise 
in recent years in the level of public dissent over the government’s handling 
of Maori affairs.
THE POLITICISATION OF MAORI AFFAIRS
Tremewan (2005a,b) canvases a number of ‘partial’ explanations for this. He 
refers to a generalised public unease over Waitangi Treaty claims, responsi-
bility for the redressing of historical wrongs, and the ethnic assertiveness of 
‘born again Maori’, but he gives priority to the culturalist ideological currents 
dominating social policy, and confines his analysis to the reasons why the 
social sciences have failed to critique these. As I have demonstrated above, I 
do not think that his charge of social science complicity in a culturalist ideo-
logical hegemony holds up. Furthermore I do not believe that it is sufficient 
to confine causal analysis of socio-political developments to the level of ideol-
ogy. To better understand the recent politicisation of Maori affairs we need to 
take a wider perspective.
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We can take the same starting point as Tremewan, the speech given by the 
National Party leader, Don Brash, in January 2004 (Brash 2004). This speech 
was essentially an attack upon the constitutional status of Maori (as the in-
digenous people of New Zealand), as secured by the Treaty of Waitangi. In 
it the idea that the Treaty had created a partnership between Maori and the 
Crown was explicitly denied, and three issues came in for special criticism: 
) government funding based on race; 2) the extension to local authorities of 
special provisions for Maori representation; and 3) the existence of legislative 
provisions under the Resource Management Act for special consultation with 
Maori. Here is the passage concerned:
There can be no basis for special privileges for any race, no basis for 
government funding based on race, no basis for introducing Maori 
wards in local authority elections, and no obligation for local gov-
ernments to consult Maori in preference to other New Zealanders.
In Brash’s own words, the overall message of the speech was that ‘The Treaty 
of Waitangi should not be used as a basis for giving greater civil, political 
or democratic rights to any particular ethnic group’. The significance of this 
speech is that it was immediately followed by an upsurge in public support for 
the National Party.
Some indication of the mindset to which the Brash speech appealed was 
given by a public opinion poll and street survey that was conducted by the 
New Zealand Herald (2004a) three weeks later. In the public opinion poll, 642 
non-Maori New Zealanders were asked whether they supported the National 
Party’s ‘proposal to remove racial distinctions from Government services’. 
Seventy-five percent of respondents said they did. But when they were asked 
in what areas did such racial distinctions occur, 36 percent could not answer, 
and those who did named special Maori health and education services, both 
of which Don Brash had said in his speech a National government would 
continue. There was a clear discrepancy between what was said in the speech 
and what the public were expressing support for. Another curiosity was that 
despite the widespread opposition to ‘race based funding’, 87 percent of those 
opposed to it said that it had little or no affect on them.
A clearer indication of the depth of feeling among the Pakeha public was 
gained from a survey of 50 people conducted on the same day as the opin-
ion poll (New Zealand Herald 2004b). A substantial majority believed that 
government funding should be based on need, not race. They believed that 
Maori received help that others were not entitled to; that this help had gone 
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too far; that the country could not endlessly make up for the wrongs of the 
past; and that the help given to Maori was too easily abused. But although 
most believed Maori got special assistance, they struggled to be specific as to 
where Government spending based on race actually occurred. Education and 
health again stood out in their attempt to name some areas. But, as we have 
seen, these were the areas which the National Party said they would continue 
to fund. Most survey respondents simply said they were opposed to special 
treatment for Maori on principle. 
When questioned about the Treaty of Waitangi there was broad support 
among survey respondents for an end to compensation payments. People 
complained that there seemed to be no end in sight; that payments were mis-
spent and that new claims kept emerging. Common assertions were: ‘It’s got 
out of control’; ‘It’s gone too far’; ‘There seems to be no end to it’. These claims 
were coupled with the view that special funding and treaty settlement money 
was misspent: ‘They want payouts all the time but what they do with it is piss 
it up against the wall’; ‘They just seem to go through the money. All those mil-
lions that go missing – it’s just not on’; ‘I think the Government is throwing all 
this money down a never-ending pit’. There was no shortage of outrage. But 
like the poll respondents, few of those questioned in the survey could pin-
point any way that they personally had been affected by special treatment for 
Maori. Many, however, feared for the future: ‘We could lose a lot of what we’ve 
got now – land, beaches – and it will affect the economy’, they said. 
In my experience, anti-Maori attitudes such as these are endemic among Pa-
keha New Zealanders. But they have changed over time. When Maori were 
perceived as a marginalized and disadvantaged group, anti-Maori attitudes 
usually took the form of paternalistic assimilationism. There was a general 
willingness amongst Pakeha to help Maori become more like them, and few 
objections were ever voiced to dedicating funds to this effect. But recently, 
since some Maori groups and individuals have become the beneficiaries of 
Treaty of Waitangi settlements, Maori as a whole have come to be perceived 
as a privileged group, and for most Pakeha the idea that an already privileged 
group should be receiving further special assistance is anathema. As a result, 
a high level of anti-Maori resentment has emerged. In my analysis, this re-
sentment has emerged from the conflation of two different but related issues: 
‘ethnically targeted social spending’ and ‘treaty claims’.
‘Ethnically targeted social spending’ is a form of positive discrimination (or 
affirmative action) that is aimed at overcoming Maori social disadvantage; 
‘treaty claims’, on the other hand, is a constitutional process whereby Maori 
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organisations are able to make claims upon the State for compensation for 
historical breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. The two issues could be consid-
ered separately. One is a matter of social welfare; the other is a constitutional 
issue. But in the popular imagination they have become conflated and as a 
result Maori have come to be seen as doubly privileged. ‘Ethnically targeted 
social spending’, as a form of positive discrimination, is seen as contradictory 
to ‘treaty claims’ that endow Maori with special privileges.
This conflation of issues has raised the level of Pakeha resentment toward 
Maori, and that resentment provided the National Party with the opportu-
nity of attracting a wider political following. The issue of ‘treaty claims’ has 
long incurred the resentment of wealthy resource developers, one of Nation-
al’s traditional constituencies, who see such claims as giving Maori privileged 
access to and control over lucrative natural resources. ‘Ethnically targeted so-
cial spending’, on the other hand, incurs the resentment of ordinary working 
class New Zealanders, who see their Maori neighbours as enjoying privileged 
access to increasingly scarce social services. Through the conflation of these 
two issues, resentment toward Maori has become heightened, and broadened, 
and able to be worked up into a populist basis for unifying the two ends of 
the New Zealand class spectrum, gifting the National Party with the means 
of gaining working-class support for its business oriented and anti-worker 
‘neo-liberal’ agenda. 
To more fully explain the rise of anti-Maori sentiment a number of additional 
factors need to be considered. Here they can be touched upon only briefly.  I 
have made much so far of the conflation of ‘ethnically targeted social spend-
ing’ and ‘treaty claims’. These two issues could be considered separately, but 
from the beginning successive governments have always considered them in 
tandem. Part of the rationale for ‘treaty claims’ has been to fund tribal or-
ganisations so they could take over from the State social welfare responsibility 
for their members. This could be described as the strategic or instrumental 
conflation of the two issues. In the public imagination, however, the confla-
tion is more irrational and prejudicial. It arises out of a wide field of Pakeha 
ignorance of Maori society that leads to such common misconceptions as 
educational scholarships paid for out of tribal funds being seen as examples of 
‘race based government funding’. This level of ignorance provides a wide field 
for the cynical promotion of a ‘politics of resentment’.
Contributing further to the ‘politics of resentment’ has been the tendency for 
policy makers to separate the socio-economic problems of Maori from those 
affecting other New Zealand families and communities. This separation re-
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sults from seeing the economic problems of Maori solely in terms of ethnicity. 
In this way they are isolated and viewed as requiring specific ‘Maori only’ so-
lutions. The present Labour led Government embarked upon this path at the 
being of its first term of office with its ‘Closing the Gaps’ policy. Then, in reac-
tion to Pakeha resentment, and on the basis of research purporting to show 
that the gap in socio-economic status between Maori and Pakeha did not ex-
ist (Chapple 2000), it changed its policy to one of  ‘Reducing Inequalities’ 
across the board. Alternative proposals by the ACT and National Parties define 
the problem of Maori disadvantage as one of individual moral shortcomings, 
and seek to deal with this through a policy of punitive welfare reforms. Both 
tendencies obscure the more fundamental causes of social disadvantage that 
can be found in the economic dislocations that have affected all New Zealand 
families and communities, regardless of ethnicity, and which stem from the 
restructuring of the economy to meet the conditions of global competition.
As in other parts of the world (Wilson 999: 490), national and international 
economic transformations since the mid-980s have placed new stresses on 
New Zealand families and communities. For some, there has been a decline in 
real wages such that many working-class families are now barely able to main-
tain their living standards on two incomes; the length of the working week 
has increased, while job security has decreased; there has been an increase 
in the cost of education and health services, so that many parents today fear 
not being able to send their children to university, or not being able to pay for 
necessary health care. Given the shock of economic restructuring, economic 
anxiety pervades the society and lingers, despite temporary improvements 
in the economy. The recent upsurge in anti-Maori feeling, expressed in op-
position to the ‘treaty rights’ and ‘race-based funding’ can be related to these 
feelings of economic insecurity. 
Studies of ethnic conflict around the world have shown that rises in ethnic 
antagonism are often related to rises in feelings of economic anxiety. During 
such times people become receptive to simplistic ideological messages that 
deflect attention away from the real complex causes of their problems and 
onto vulnerable groups. Ethnic minorities, immigrants and welfare benefi-
ciaries are the normal targets of such antagonism. But this does not happen 
spontaneously. It takes highly visible spokespeople to channel peoples’ frus-
trations in this direction (Wilson 999: 495), and we have seen recent exam-
ples of this in New Zealand. There is the example of NZ First’s attacks upon 
non-European immigrants. There is the ACT Party’s persistent denigration of 
welfare beneficiaries. Now the National Party has adopted the same strategy 
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in its attacks upon Maori. It is primarily a vote gathering, constituency-build-
ing exercise that appeals to the worst features of human nature.
Finally there is the influence of neo-liberal ideology upon peoples’ under-
standings of social processes and its attachment to the idea of ‘race’. As is well 
known, neo-liberalism is averse to the idea of society as a constellation of 
social groups. To the neo-liberal, society is a constellation of individuals. In 
neo-liberal ideology there is no place for the concepts of ‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’, 
or ‘indigeneity’, in so far as these concepts are inextricably linked to the no-
tion of social groups.  ‘Race’, on the other hand, despite the fact that it is a 
socially constructed identity, can be more easily understood as the property 
of individuals, in the sense that individuals can be identified on the basis of 
their bodily characteristics (e.g. skin colour). It is therefore easy to accommo-
date the idea of ‘race’ within neo-liberal ideology, where in accordance with 
notions of meritocracy it is criticised as a basis for discrimination. This might 
explain why neo-liberal apologists often express their opposition to ethnically 
targeted affirmative action in terms of the unjustifiable allocation of privileges 
on the basis of ‘skin colour’. There seems to be an incapacity within neo-liberal 
ideology to accommodate the notion of group identities and to separate them 
from the characteristics of individuals, imputed or otherwise. As a result, 
rights and privileges that accrue to groups (whether they be ‘cultural’, ‘ethnic’ 
or ‘indigenous’) can only be conceived within neo-liberalism as accruing to 
individuals on the basis of their ‘racial’ characteristics. Within the confines of 
this narrow individualist ideology, and in the light of current proscriptions on 
racial discrimination, it is possible for neo-liberals to feel justified in oppos-
ing any form of ethnically targeted social spending or ‘treaty rights’ (Barber 
2005).
CONCLUSION
Until 2004, a consensus existed in New Zealand politics between the two ma-
jor political parties (Labour and National) with regard to Maori affairs. This 
consensus was expressed in terms of a shared commitment to ‘biculturalism’ 
(the official recognition of Maori cultural values and their incorporation into 
official public discourse and policy considerations). It was from this com-
mitment that the National Party has been trying to resile. By building on a 
groundswell of Pakeha resentment toward Maori, it aimed to differentiate it-
self from Labour and attract electoral support. The important question is why 
had there been such a rise in the level of public dissent in recent years over 
government handling of Maori affairs that this political option had become 
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available? Tremewan (2005a,b) says that it is because a culturalist ideology 
dominates social policy and this has had an alienating effect on large sections 
of the population. I have argued that it is not sufficient to confine explanation 
of socio-political developments to the analysis of ideology in this way. A great 
many other factors, including the material conditions of existence, and the 
opportunism of power-seeking politicians, are involved. Even at the level of 
ideology, I would argue, it is not culturalism that is responsible for the politi-
cisation of Maori affairs, but neo-liberalism. 
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